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Abstract	
Over	 the	 last	 three	 decades,	 welfare	 states	 across	 the	West	 have	 embraced	 a	 host	 of	 new	
technologies	and	initiatives	in	the	name	of	fighting	welfare	abuse	and	fraud	(see	Cook	1989,	
2006;	Wacquant	2001,	2009).	Increasingly,	these	practices	of	‘welfare	policing’	are	graduated	
according	to	risk;	particular	welfare	populations	considered	at	greater	risk	of	welfare	fraud	
are	 subject	 to	more	 intense	 scrutiny.	Drawing	on	 interview	research	with	 compliance	 staff	
from	 the	Australian	Department	 of	Human	 Services,	 this	 paper	 critically	 explores	 how	 the	
rationality	of	risk	figures	in	the	process	of	welfare	surveillance	in	Australia.	It	pays	particular	
attention	to	the	ways	in	which	risk	formulations	are	embedded	in	gender	and	class	politics,	
and	how	this	has	led	to	the	characterisation	of	single	mothers	and	unemployed	recipients	as	
more	 ‘risky’	 than	 the	 general	 welfare	 population,	 a	 point	 that	 is	 often	 overlooked	 in	 the	
literature.	But,	 far	 from	being	 immutable,	 this	paper	also	considers	how	the	politics	of	 risk	
are	open	to	reformulation	with	often	unexpected	results.	
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Introduction	
In	recent	decades,	welfare	states	across	the	Anglophone	West	have	bolstered	their	bureaucratic	
capacities	 in	 the	name	of	 fighting	 social	welfare	 fraud.	 In	doing	so,	welfare	departments	have	
increasingly	taken	inspiration	from	a	host	of	traditional	and	novel	policing	tactics	(Chunn	and	
Gavigan	2006;	Ericson	2007;	Gustafson	2011;	Wacquant	2001,	2009;	Walsh	and	Marston	2008).	
Many	 state	welfare	 agencies	 now	boast	 a	 veritable	 army	 of	 fraud	 and	 compliance	 staff	 and	 a	
growing	list	of	sophisticated	technologies	for	detecting	and	investigating	fraud.	In	Australia,	the	
Department	of	Human	Services	 (DHS)	 (which	subsumed	 the	 functions	of	Centrelink1	 in	2011)	
draws	 on	 an	 expansive	 and	 sophisticated	 compliance	 regime	 comprised	 of	 advanced	 data	
analytics	 and	profiling	 technologies;	 a	 large	 and	 sophisticated	data‐matching	program;	 covert	
optical	 surveillance	 outsourced	 to	 private	 security	 companies;	 and	 a	 dedicated	 fraud	 tip‐off	
hotline	 (Prenzler	 2012).	 Increasingly,	 welfare	 bureaucrats	 in	 Australia	 and	 elsewhere	 are	
engaged	in	surveillance	and	investigation	practices,	functions	ordinarily	associated	with	police	
departments.	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 unsurprising	 that	 the	 former	 Minister	 for	
Social	 Services,	 Scott	 Morrison,	 and	 Minister	 for	 Human	 Services,	 Marise	 Payne,	 in	 the	 then	
Prime	 Minister	 Tony	 Abbott’s	 Liberal‐National	 Coalition	 Government,	 described	 DHS	
compliance	 staff	 as	 ‘welfare	 cops’,	 likening	 their	 role	 to	 that	 of	 frontline	 street	police	 officers	
(Morrison	 and	 Payne	 2015).	Ms	 Payne’s	 successor,	 Stuart	 Robert,	 who	was	 appointed	 to	 the	
position	in	September	2015	with	the	change	of	leadership	to	Prime	Minister	Malcolm	Turnbull,	
appears	to	have	adopted	a	similar	line,	launching	‘Taskforce	Integrity’	soon	after	he	was	sworn	
into	 office	 to	 continue	 strategic	 ‘operations’	 targeting	 individuals	 at	 risk	 of	 welfare	 fraud	
(Robert	2015).		
	
Increasingly,	 these	practices	of	 ‘policing	welfare’	 are	organised	by	 logics	 of	 risk	management.	
Segments	of	the	welfare	population	identified	as	‘at	risk’	of	welfare	fraud	and/or	overpayment	
are	subject	to	more	frequent	and	intensive	surveillance.	Consequently,	these	welfare	recipients	
must	do	more	 to	demonstrate	their	eligibility	 for	welfare	entitlements	(Henman	2004).	 In	 the	
Australian	 welfare	 arena,	 women,	 and	 particularly	 single	 mothers,	 are	 often	 cast	 as	 risky.	
Women	 are	 subject	 to	 some	 of	 the	most	 intensive	 surveillance	 and	 are	 twice	 as	 likely	 to	 be	
convicted	 of	welfare	 fraud	 offences	 compared	 to	men	 (Prenzler	 2012).	 In	 the	 same	way	 that	
young	 men	 and	 boys	 are	 so	 often	 the	 object	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system,	 women	 are	
overrepresented	 as	 suspects,	 as	 defendants,	 and	 in	 public	 messages	 about	 ‘welfare	 cheats’	
(Wilcock	 2014).	 Recipients	 of	 unemployment	 benefits	 closely	 follow	 single	 mothers	 as	 more	
frequent	targets	of	surveillance.	This	suggests	that	particular	classed	and	gendered	assumption	
shape	welfare	surveillance	practices.		
	
Whilst	 acknowledging	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 regressive	 risk	 regimes	 in	 the	 arena	 of	 social	
security	compliance,	 this	paper	also	pays	attention	to	the	malleability	of	risk	rationalities.	Far	
from	 being	 immutable,	 I	 argue	 that	 risk	 rationalities	 are	 open	 to	 re‐interpretation	 and	
modification,	 including	by	DHS	staff	engaged	 in	compliance	work.	This	presents	opportunities	
for	the	articulation	of	more	progressive	agendas,	which	can	result	in	less	punitive	outcomes	for	
apparently	‘risky’	social	security	recipients.	
	
Informed	by	a	governmentality	analytic,	this	paper	explores	the	deployment	of	risk	rationalities	
by	 the	 DHS	 with	 focus	 on	 two	 risk‐based	 initiatives:	 the	 data	 mining	 customer	 profiling	
program;	 and	 the	 introduction	of	 tiered	 compliance	 reviews.	 In	doing	 so,	 I	 draw	on	12	 semi‐
structured	 interviews	 with	 DHS	 welfare	 compliance	 staff,	 supplemented	 by	 documentary	
sources.	 Analysis	 of	 these	 two	 projects	 illustrates	 how	 the	 rationality	 of	 risk	 can	 play	 out	
differently	depending	on	the	goals	and	agendas	 to	which	these	rationalities	are	aligned.	But	 it	
also	 makes	 visible	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 old	 and	 new	 meanings	 about	 gender,	 poverty	 and	
criminality	fundamentally	shape	definitions	of	riskiness,	and	how	welfare	surveillance	practices	
play	out	more	generally.	This	is	a	point	that	is	routinely	overlooked	in	analyses	of	risk	(Hannah‐
Moffat	and	O’Malley	2007;	Henman	and	Marston	2008).		
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In	 this	paper,	 I	 first	 set	 out	 the	governmentality	 approach	 that	 I	 employ	 in	 this	 article.	 I	 then	
turn	to	an	examination	of	the	emergence	and	consolidation	of	risk	rationalities	in	the	Australian	
social	 security	 system.	 I	use	 two	case	 studies,	 the	data	mining	customer	profiling	project	and	
tiered	customer	reviews,	to	examine	key	assumptions	underpinning	risk	management	practices	
and	 how	 gender	 and	 class	 shape	 risk	 rationalities.	 Finally,	 this	 paper	 briefly	 considers	 the	
potential	 for	 rearticulating	 risk	 rationalities	 for	 more	 progressive	 ends.	Whilst	 the	 empirical	
focus	of	this	paper	is	firmly	in	the	Australian	context,	I	anticipate	that	the	analysis	has	broader	
relevance	for	understanding	the	deployment	of	risk	rationalities	in	the	welfare	arena	elsewhere.	
This	is	because	the	analysis	acts	as	a	firm	reminder	that	risk	rationalities	need	to	be	examined	
in	context,	and	in	a	manner	that	is	attuned	to	the	operation	of	class	and	gender	politics.		
	
Employing	a	governmentality	approach		
This	 paper	 utilises	 a	 governmentality	 framework	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 emergence	 and	
implementation	of	 risk	 rationalities	 in	Australia’s	welfare	compliance	 regime.	Foucault	 (2007,	
2008)	 developed	 the	 concept	 of	 governmentality	 during	 two	 lecture	 series	 presented	 at	 the	
Collège	 de	 France	 in	 1977‐78	 and	 1978‐79.	 To	 explain	 this	 concept,	 he	 revived	 the	 sixteenth	
century	definition	of	‘government’	in	which	the	term	referred	broadly	to	any	calculated	plan	to	
direct	 or	 manage	 one’s	 self	 or	 others.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 welfare	 surveillance	 and	 other	
compliance	 activities	 can	 be	 construed	 as	 a	 form	 of	 governance.	 Foucault’s	 understanding	 of	
government	 ultimately	 shifts	 the	 focus	 of	 analysis	 away	 from	 the	 political	 institutions	 of	 the	
state	and	towards	an	examination	of	specific	governmental	techniques;	to	put	it	more	crudely,	
the	‘how’	of	governing.		
	
This	 concept	 has	 been	 adopted	 and	 elaborated	 by	 scholars	 into	 a	 fully‐fledged	 conceptual	
framework	 for	 examining	 specific	 projects	 of	 government	 (see	Gordon	1991;	Miller	 and	Rose	
2008;	Rose	1999;	Rose	and	Miller	1992).	Rose	and	Miller	(1992)	analyse	government	in	terms	
of	the	‘rationalities’	that	underpin	calculated	plans	to	govern	people	and	the	‘technologies’	that	
are	mobilised	 to	 carry	 out	 these	 plans.	Where	 rationalities	make	 certain	 forms	 of	 governing	
thinkable	and	justifiable,	 technologies	are	the	 ‘complex	of	mundane	programmes,	calculations,	
techniques,	apparatuses,	documents	and	procedures	through	which	authorities	seek	to	embody	
and	give	effect	to	governmental	ambition’	(Rose	and	Miller	1992:	175).	
	
A	 governmentality	 analytic	 offers	 a	 particularly	 fruitful	 approach	 for	 the	 present	 research.	 It	
provides	 a	 critical	 lens	 through	 which	 to	 interrogate	 the	 calculated	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 DHS	
conceive	 of,	 and	 govern,	 the	 problem	 of	 welfare	 fraud	 and	 its	 proponents.	 Importantly,	 it	
facilitates	 a	 more	 nuanced	 and	 precise	 account	 of	 the	 complexities	 of	 risk‐based	 practices	
compared	 to	 totalising	 versions	 of	 state	 action.	 Through	 a	 governmentality	 lens,	 I	 can	move	
beyond	the	condemnation	of	welfare	compliance	strategies	as	wholly	punitive	and	unpack	the	
explicit	 and	 implicit	 objectives	 that	 underpin	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance,	 including	 how	
gender	and	class	figure	in	these	initiatives.	
	
I	 supplement	 this	 governmentality	 analysis	 with	 empirical	 research	 of	 ‘actual’	 risk‐based	
approaches	 to	 compliance.	 In	 doing	 so,	 I	 take	 influence	 from	 Stenson’s	 (2005:	 266;	 see	 also	
Lippert	 and	 Stenson	 2010)	 ‘realist	 governmentality’	 approach	 in	which	 ‘discourse	 analysis	 of	
mentalities’	 is	 combined	with	 ‘grounded,	empirical,	 realist	 analysis	of	governing	practices’.	As	
Lippert	 and	 Stenson	 (2010:	 486)	 explain,	 such	 an	 approach	 does	 not	 espouse	 a	 revival	 of	 a	
positivist	conception	of	‘the	real’	nor	indeed	the	realism	of	the	critical	realist	movement,	which	
they	suggest	tends	towards	‘thinly	disguised	Marxist	materialism’.	Instead,	the	authors	‘have	in	
mind	a	more	plural,	protean	reality	in	relation	to	specific	programmes	and	rationalities’,	which	
pays	 attention	 to	 context	 and	 the	 ‘conditions	 of	 possibility	 and	 contingency’	 (Lippert	 and	
Stenson	 2010:	 486).	As	 Stenson	 contends	 (2005:	 274),	 combining	 a	 governmentality	 analysis	
with	 empirical	 research	 enables	 scholars	 to	 develop	 contextually	 sensitive	 accounts	 of	 the	
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governance	 of	 crime.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 facilitates	 an	 analysis	 of	 ‘governance	 from	above	 and	
below’.		
	
This	approach	stands	in	opposition	to	a	number	of	eminent	governmentality	scholars.	Notably,	
Nikolas	 Rose	 (1999:	 19)	 has	 argued	 for	 a	 separation	 of	 governmentality	 ‘diagnoses’	 and	
sociologies	of	governance.	But	as	O’Malley	(2010a:	329)	asserts,	 ‘It	could	be	argued	…	that	no‐
one	can	 legislate	how	[governmentality]	must	be	performed	and	what	 it	must	or	must	not	be	
articulated	with’.	 In	 line	with	O’Malley’s	 sentiments,	 I	 view	governmentality	 as	 a	more	elastic	
‘analytical	toolbox’,	which	can	be	utilised	by	scholars	in	a	variety	of	ways	for	different	purposes.	
More	 importantly,	 the	 articulation	 of	 governmentality	 with	 grounded,	 empirical	 analysis	
addresses	some	of	the	key	deficiencies	of	a	governmentality	approach.	In	particular,	it	can	help	
to	overcome	the	tendency	 in	governmentality	studies	to	produce	overly	abstract	analyses	and	
take	account	of	the	power	and	impacts	of	the	modern	state.	As	McKee	(2009:	467)	contends,	a	
realist	 governmentality	 approach	 can	 ‘reveal	 the	 messiness	 and	 complexity	 involved	 in	 the	
struggles	around	subjectivity,	and	offer	a	more	nuanced	and	finely	grained	analysis	of	governing	
in	situ’.	
	
Method	
In	line	with	this	approach,	I	seek	to	bring	together	documentary	sources	as	well	as	analysis	of	
interview	 data	 to	 examine	 the	 enactment	 of	 risk	 rationalities	 within	 the	 DHS’s	 Business	
Integrity	Division.	 Specifically,	 I	 draw	 from	12	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 conducted	 in	2014	
and	 2015	 with	 Business	 Integrity	 staff.	 Ten	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 staff	 from	 the	
Serious	Non‐Compliance	(SNC)	section	of	 the	Business	 Integrity	Division	presently	working	in	
the	areas	of	data	mining	and	predictive	analytics,	intelligence	analysis	and	fraud	investigation.	A	
further	two	interviews	were	conducted	with	Customer	Compliance	Branch	(CCB)	staff	engaged	
in	customer	review	work.	Where	the	SNC	section	is	principally	concerned	with	suspected	cases	
of	fraud,	the	CCB	is	centred	on	payment	integrity	and	overpayment	detection	and	recovery.		
	
These	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	 the	 permission	 of	 the	 DHS	 and	 under	 the	 terms	 of	 a	
Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MoU).	All	but	two	interviews	were	conducted	in	person	across	
four	 Australian	 jurisdictions.	 All	 interviews	 lasted	 between	 45	 minutes	 and	 1.5	 hours.	 The	
interviews	were	 coded	 thematically,	 paying	 particular	 attention	 to	 issues	 of	 risk	 and	 gender,	
and	the	relationship	between	them.	Pseudonyms	replace	 interviewees’	names	 in	 this	paper	to	
protect	the	anonymity	of	the	participants.	Whilst	drawing	on	all	interviews,	I	rely	most	heavily	
on	the	interviews	conducted	with	Henry	and	Daniel	of	the	SNC	Section	and	John	from	the	CCB,	
as	these	research	participants	were	directly	involved	in	the	development	and	implementation	of	
data	mining	and	the	tiered	review	system	respectively.		
	
The	 core	 of	 the	 documentary	 source	 data	 derives	 from	 a	 systematic	 analysis	 of	 all	 annual	
reports	 issued	 by	 the	 former	 Department	 of	 Social	 Security	 since	 1970.	 I	 also	 draw	 more	
sporadically	on	Centrelink	and	DHS	annual	reports,	past	and	present	DHS	compliance	strategies,	
and	information	garnered	through	the	Senate	estimates	process.	From	this	data,	I	have	sought	
to	chart	the	emergence	of	the	language	and	practice	of	risk	management	within	the	department.	
Ultimately,	these	data	provide	the	broad	outline	with	which	to	contextualise	the	interview	data.	
Together,	these	data	complement	one	another,	with	each	providing	a	particular	insight	into	the	
somewhat	opaque	practices	of	policing	welfare.		
	
It	 is	however	 important	 to	recognise	the	 limitations	of	 the	data.	First,	 the	 interview	sample	 is	
unquestionably	 small	 and	 selective.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	when	 considering	 the	 size	of	 the	
Business	Integrity	(BI)	division,	which	comprises	hundreds,	perhaps	thousands,	of	staff	working	
across	 Australia.	 Consequently,	 it	 would	 be	 inappropriate	 to	 draw	 broad	 conclusions	 about	
welfare	compliance	practices	from	the	data.	The	sample	is	best	described	as	a	purposive	sample	
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designed	 to	 provide	 important	 and	 rich	 insights	 about	 the	workings	 of	 individual	 teams	 and	
initiatives	in	the	DHS,	albeit	from	the	participant’s	own	perspective.		
	
Secondly,	the	MoU	set	limitations	on	this	research.	Significantly,	the	MoU	obliges	me	to	submit	
drafts	of	my	work	prior	to	publication	to	the	DHS	for	‘clearance	of	departmental	content’.	Senior	
management	explained	that	this	provision	was	essential	for	verifying	accuracy	and	identifying	
and	 redacting	 material	 that	 would	 ‘compromise	 a	 fraud	 operation’:	 that	 is,	 reveal	 specific	
information	about	an	operation	that	is	currently	underway.	In	line	with	this	requirement,	a	draft	
of	this	paper	was	submitted	to	the	Department	for	review.	Comments	from	a	senior	DHS	official	
clarifying	the	scope	of	work	of	the	Data	Mining	Team	were	subsequently	incorporated	into	this	
revised	version	of	this	paper.		
	
The	methods	employed	in	this	research	undoubtedly	shape	and	constrain	the	research	findings.	
But	while	the	approach	adopted	here	might	prevent	the	making	of	wide‐ranging	and	emphatic	
conclusions	about	welfare	policing	in	Australia,	this	is	not	the	paper’s	intent.	Instead,	this	paper	
aims	to	offer	contextualised	insights	into	two	specific	risk‐based	strategies	from	the	perspective	
of	participants	who	have	been	directly	involved	in	crafting	and	implementing	these	strategies.	
Ultimately,	it	is	hoped	that	this	approach	will	draw	attention	to	some	of	the	messy	‘realities’	of	
implementing	 risk‐based	 approaches	 to	 welfare	 compliance,	 albeit	 a	 somewhat	 small	 and	
selective	observation	of	them.	
	
The	rise	of	risk	in	Australian	social	security	compliance		
Western	welfare	states	have	a	long	history	of	drawing	on	criminal	justice	strategies	in	the	name	
of	 guarding	 against	 fraud	 and	 abuse.	 In	 fact,	 in	 Australia,	 police	 officials	 were	 intimately	
involved	 in	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 first	 Invalid	 and	 Old‐Age	 Pension	 schemes	 in	 the	 early	
twentieth	century.	According	 to	 the	NSW	Police	Manual	 (1915:	90),	 officers	were	 responsible	
for	assisting	claimants	with	pension	documents,	and	were	charged	with	investigating	the	‘truth	
of	 statements	 contained	 in	 claims’.	 From	 the	 outset,	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 pension	 in	
Australia	assumed	the	dishonesty	of	applicants.	 In	Henman	and	Marston’s	words	(2008:	194),	
the	 ‘social	 assistance	 system	 has	 a	 long	 history	 of	 highly	 intrusive,	 detailed	 and	 ongoing	
surveillance	of	claimants	and	recipients	to	minimise	fraud	and	ensure	eligibility’.	
	
Notwithstanding	this	lineage,	the	approach	to	policing	the	problem	of	welfare	fraud	has	shifted	
significantly	 in	 recent	 decades.	 Whereas	 previous	 forms	 of	 welfare	 surveillance	 and	
investigation	were	 largely	discretionary	and	ad	hoc,	since	the	 late	1970s,	welfare	policing	has	
become	 increasingly	 centralised,	 systematic	 and	 risk‐based.	 Certainly,	 targeting	 more	
‘suspicious’	or	apparently	underserving	welfare	recipients	is	far	from	new	(Henman	2004).	But	
the	emergence	of	actuarial	risk	logics	in	the	welfare	arena	and	the	concomitant	rise	of	advanced	
data	 analytic	 software	 have	 made	 the	 process	 of	 identifying	 and	 targeting	 risky	 welfare	
populations	far	more	systematic,	even	automatic.		
	
In	many	respects,	the	rise	of	risk	in	the	welfare	compliance	regime	forms	part	of	broader	shifts	
in	 the	welfare	state.	 In	 the	mid	 to	 late	1970s,	 in	 the	context	of	economic	crisis,	welfare	states	
across	 the	West	 were	 increasingly	 under	 attack.	 By	 1974,	 Australia,	 along	 with	much	 of	 the	
Western	world,	was	in	the	midst	of	recession,	punctuated	by	growing	long‐term	unemployment,	
and	rising	 inflation	and	 interest	 rates.	This	 tumultuous	economic	climate	produced	a	 sense	of	
crisis	 and	 vulnerability,	 inviting	 scrutiny	 of	 the	 reigning	 logic	 of	Keynesianism	 (Archer	 2009;	
Marston	 and	 McDonald	 2007;	 Mendes	 2008).	 This	 loss	 of	 faith	 in	 Keynesianism	 hinged	 in	
particular	on	the	sharp	and	simultaneous	rise	of	stagnation	and	 inflation	(‘stagflation’),	which	
could	not	be	explained	by	Keynesian	economic	theory.	This	environment	provided	 ideological	
space	for	the	ascendency	of	New	Right	politics	in	Australia,	marked	by	the	election	of	the	Fraser	
Coalition	Government	in	1975.		
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The	New	Right	refers	to	a	coalition	of	neoliberal	and	neoconservative	rationalities.	It	rests	on	a	
faith	 in	 the	 globalised	 and	 liberalised	 market	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 socially	 conservative	
valorisation	 of	 traditional	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 family	 and	 retributive	 punishment,	 on	 the	
other	 (Mendes	 2008;	 O’Malley	 1999).	 Whilst	 there	 are	 tensions	 within	 this	 alliance,	 both	
neoliberals	and	neoconservatives	reject	Universalist	approaches	to	welfare	provision	and	share	
a	 belief	 in	 individual	 responsibility	 for	 unemployment.	 Unsurprisingly	 then,	 ‘pruning’	 the	
wasteful	 elements	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 became	 a	 core	 policy	 of	 the	 Fraser	 Government	
(Pemberton	1980).		
	
Part	of	this	New	Right	welfare	reform	agenda	was	a	commitment	to	crackdown	on	‘dole	cheats’.	
Perhaps	 ironically,	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 the	 costs	 of	 welfare	 coincided	 with	 a	 massive	
redeployment	 of	 state	 resources	 to	 scrutinise	 and	 monitor	 welfare	 recipients	 (Pemberton	
1980).	 In	 1977,	 specialist	 Benefit	 Control	 sections	 were	 established	 to	 investigate	 non‐
compliance	and	fraud.	These	quickly	swelled	from	just	15	staff	to	106	staff	in	1979,	whilst	the	
number	of	Field	Officers	jumped	from	188	to	350	in	the	same	period	(Pemberton	1980:	33‐34).	
So‐called	 ‘saturation	checks’	were	also	 introduced,	 in	which	 field	officers	 knocked	on	 literally	
hundreds	 of	 thousands	 of	 claimants’	 doors	 to	 check	 their	 eligibility	 (see	 Benefits	 Checks	
Confirmed	1978).		
	
The	 rapid	 increase	 in	 the	 numbers	 of	 welfare	 claimants	 led	 the	 Department	 to	 re‐think	 its	
approach	 (DSS	 1997).	 The	 localised	 and	 personalised	 policing	 of	 decades	 past	was	 no	 longer	
feasible.	As	the	1978‐79	Department	of	Social	Security	(DSS)	Annual	Report	(1979:	58)	reads:		
	
Ensuring	 that	 each	 individual	 obtains	 his	 or	 her	 correct	 entitlement	 under	 the	
relevant	legislation	has	inevitably	been	made	more	difficult	by	the	rapid	growth	
in	 the	 numbers	 covered	 by	 income	 support	 programs	 administered	 by	 the	
Department	…	While	the	rate	of	 identification	of	 [false]	claims	can	be	 increased	
by	more	detailed	examination,	a	disproportionate	level	of	resources	would	need	
to	be	employed	…	The	Department	believes	that	the	problems	associated	with	the	
scale	 of	 its	 payments,	 the	 extent	 of	 decentralisation	 of	 its	 functions,	 and	 the	
existence	of	fraud,	can	best	be	tackled	using	innovative	methods.	
	
Whilst	 the	 language	 of	 risk	 is	 not	 yet	 explicit,	 this	 statement	 hints	 at	 its	 development.	 This	
passage	 also	 suggests	 the	 Department’s	 acceptance	 of	 the	 need	 to	 target	 surveillance	 on	
particular	segments	of	the	welfare	population.	Already,	the	Department	had	introduced	periodic	
reviews	of	pensioners	‘whose	entitlements	are	liable	to	vary’,	again	suggesting	a	move	towards	
selective	 application	of	 surveillance	practices	 based	on	 apparent	 likelihood	of	 debt	 and	 fraud	
(DSS	1979:	58).		
	
Whilst	 the	 sharp	 influx	 of	 benefit	 recipients	 undoubtedly	 fuelled	 the	 development	 of	 risk	
rationalities,	it	also	reflects	the	spread	of	risk	logics	in	the	field	of	crime	control	more	generally.	
The	new	salience	afforded	to	risk–based	approaches	has	led	some,	notably	Ulrich	Beck	(1992),	
to	declare	the	arrival	of	the	‘risk	society.’	Whilst	dubious	of	such	totalising	claims,	there	is	little	
doubt	 that	 risk	 logics	 have	 enjoyed	 exponential	 growth	 in	 recent	 decades.	 For	Zedner	 (2007:	
262),	the	rise	of	risk‐based	approaches	is	linked	to	the	emergence	of	a	‘pre‐crime’	society.	The	
label	 ‘pre‐crime’	 captures	 the	 temporal	 shift	 in	 dominant	 understandings	 and	 responses	 to	
crime:	 no	 longer	 is	 crime	 ‘conceived	 principally	 as	 harm	 or	 wrongdoing	 and	 the	 dominant	
ordering	 practices	…	 post	 hoc’;	 now,	 ‘crime	 is	 conceived	 essentially	 as	 risk	 or	 potential	 loss’	
requiring	pre‐emptive	responses	to	forestall	future	crime	(Zedner	2007:	262).	In	short,	the	rise	
of	 risk	 in,	 and	 pre‐emptive	 responses	 to,	 social	 security	 fraud	 and	 compliance	 is	 but	 one	
example	of	a	broader	trend.		
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The	rise	of	risk	is	connected	to	the	growing	dominance	of	New	Right	politics,	and	particularly	
neoliberal	 ideologies.	 In	 O’Malley’s	 words,	 risk	 and	 neoliberalism	 have	 certain	 ‘elective	
affinities’	(O’Malley	2001:	89).	Risk	management	techniques	appeal	to	the	neoliberal	emphasis	
on	 efficiency,	 cost	 effectiveness	 and	 accountability.	 Similarly,	 neoliberal	 faith	 in	 individualism	
and	‘personal	responsibility’	fits	neatly	with	predictive	risk	technologies,	which	focus	attention	
on	 individual	risk	 factors	rather	 than	social	causes	 (O’Malley	2001).	Furthermore,	 as	Henman	
and	 Marston	 (2008:	 200)	 argue,	 neoliberal	 welfare	 rationalities	 effectively	 require	 risk	
technologies:	
	
Given	 the	 increasingly	 individualised	 explanations	 of	 disadvantage	 and	 social	
inequality	in	line	with	a	pervasive	neoliberal	rationality,	the	governance	of	social	
problems	 demands	 a	 capacity	 to	 target	 and	 track	 subpopulations	 to	 calculate	
levels	of	individual	and	social	risk,	and	in	turn	to	regulate	their	behaviour.	
	
However,	as	O’Malley	(2001:	90)	stresses,	risk	is	not	necessarily	underpinned	by	neoliberalism:	
‘the	politics	of	risk	and	the	social	are	not	fixed,	nor	is	the	march	of	neo‐liberalism	inexorable’.	
This	is	a	theme	I	will	return	to	later	in	this	paper.		
	
Risk	approaches	came	to	full	fruition	in	the	mid‐1980s	in	Australia.	With	the	implementation	of	
the	first	integrated	and	comprehensive	fraud	and	overpayment	strategy,	the	DSS	placed	greater	
emphasis	on	developing	 its	 risk‐based	approaches.	 In	1986,	 the	DSS	 (1986:	81)	reported	 that	
‘Good	 progress	 has	 been	 made	 on	 the	 development	 of	 a	 risk‐related	 approach	 to	 the	
investigation	of	 new	claims’.	 In	 the	 following	year,	 the	DSS	 (1987:	24)	elaborated	on	 its	 risk‐
based	approach,	noting:		
	
The	 Department	 believes	 that	 frequent,	 detailed	 reviews	 of	 all	 clients	 to	 be	
inappropriate	because	most	are	honest	and	meet	their	obligations	under	the	law.	
Reviewing	 all	 clients	 also	 wastes	 resources.	 The	 Department,	 therefore,	 has	
developed	 a	 risk‐based	 approach	 to	 select	 those	 cases	 most	 likely	 to	 need	
attention.	Statistical	surveys	are	analysed	to	provide	an	outline	of	people	with	an	
above	average	risk	of	incorrect	payment.	The	computer	selects	clients	with	these	
characteristics	 and,	 through	 the	 National	 Selective	 Review	 System	 (NSRS),	
regional	office	staff	are	asked	to	review	them.		
	
In	 other	words,	 the	 Department	 analysed	 recipient	 data	 using	 statistical	methods	 to	 develop	
risk	profiles;	 that	 is,	 collections	of	 customer	characteristics	apparently	associated	with	higher	
levels	of	overpayment	and	fraud.	Recipients	that	fit	these	profiles	were	deemed	more	likely	to	
incur	a	welfare	overpayment	or	engage	in	fraud,	and	were	therefore	tagged	for	more	frequent	
or	intensive	scrutiny	(Henman	2004).	These	risk	profiles	provided	apparently	objective	criteria	
for	 the	 selective	 targeting	of	welfare	 recipients.	This	 approach	 to	 risk	 can	be	described	 as	 an	
actuarial	risk	management	model.	It	is	underpinned	by	a	predictive	logic	and	assumes	that	past	
data	is	a	reliable	predictor	of	future	behaviour.	As	Henman	(2004:	179)	explains,	in	these	risk	
technologies,	‘the	notion	of	a	suspect	is	recast	and	inverted.	Instead	of	being	someone	suspected	
of	 being	 responsible	 for	 a	 known	 crime,	 the	 suspect	 is	 now	 someone	 who	might	 have	 done	
something	we	do	not	know	of	or	may	do	in	the	future’.		
	
With	the	continuing	advancements	in	data	analytic	software,	and	the	spread	of	data	surveillance	
across	 the	 private	 and	 public	 sectors,	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance	 has	 only	 continued	 to	
grow.	Risk	technologies	have	become	more	sophisticated	and	large‐scale.	Since	2004,	the	DHS	–	
and	Centrelink	before	 it	 –	 has	 progressively	 increased	 its	 data	mining	 capacity,	 including	 the	
establishment	 of	 a	 dedicated	 data	 mining	 team	 in	 2009	 to	 employ	 ‘advanced	 statistical	
techniques’	 to	 identify	 high	 risk	 customers	 (Australian	 Government	 2009).	 Yet,	 while	 the	
technologies	 and	 statistical	 approaches	 have	 advanced	 significantly	 since	 the	mid‐1980s,	 the	
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present	 approach	 to	 risk‐based	 surveillance	 resembles	 its	 earliest	 forms.	 The	 predominant	
approach	is	based	on	a	calculative	model	in	which	vast	bodies	of	customer	data	are	translated	
into	predictive	formulae.	
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance	 occurred	
alongside	 the	 development	 of	 a	 host	 of	 other	 tools	 and	 technologies	 for	 monitoring	 welfare	
recipients	 that	do	not	 rest	on	risk	 logics	or	at	 least	not	 the	same	kinds	of	actuarial	 risk	 logics	
outlined	 above.	 For	 example,	 Centrelink’s	 fraud	media	 strategy,	which	 centres	 on	 publicising	
successful	 fraud	 prosecutions,	 is	 explicitly	 understood	 as	 a	 ‘deterrent	 measure	 for	 those	
customers	who	may	consider	that	failing	to	meet	their	obligations	carries	no	detrimental	effects’	
(Centrelink	 2009).	 It	 also	 represents	 a	 public	 display	 of	 the	 state’s	 vigilance	 in	 the	 face	 of	
welfare	fraud,	a	strategy	that	Garland	might	refer	to	as	an	‘expressive’	strategy	(Garland	2001).	
Similarly,	 the	Centrelink	 fraud	tip‐off	 is	not	a	risk	tool,	but	 instead	reflects	a	 ‘responsibilizing’	
strategy	 in	which	the	state	requests	 the	support	of	citizens	 in	the	 fight	against	 fraud	(Garland	
2001).	 In	 short,	 the	 rationality	 of	 risk	 is	 a	 core	 organising	principle	 in	 the	Australian	welfare	
compliance	regime,	but	it	is	not	the	only	rationality	in	operation.		
	
Indeed,	during	the	 late	1990s,	 the	emphasis	shifted	 from	targeted	risk‐based	surveillance	to	a	
high	 volume	 of	 entitlement	 reviews.	 This	 was	 driven	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 quantitative	
review	targets	 in	which	Centrelink	was	required	 to	conduct	a	specific	number	of	reviews.	For	
example,	in	2001,	Centrelink’s	review	benchmark	was	1.1	million	(Centrelink	2001:	52).	Whilst	
the	precise	targets	in	the	years	that	followed	are	not	publically	available,	 it	 is	likely	that	these	
review	 benchmarks	were	 even	 higher.	 For	 example,	 in	 2005‐06	 Centrelink	 conducted	 over	 4	
million	reviews,	representing	about	two	thirds	of	the	customer	population	(Centrelink	2006:	9,	
27).	 In	 2009‐10	 there	 were	 3.5	million	 reviews	 conducted	 against	 a	 population	 of	 about	 7.2	
million	 customers	 (Centrelink	 2010:	 8).	 The	 rationality	 of	 risk	 was	 still	 present,	 but	 the	
emphasis	on	volume	reviews	diluted	it.	
	
Since	2008,	the	DHS	has	sought	to	refocus	 its	compliance	efforts	on	customers	most	at	risk	of	
overpayments.	The	data	mining	team	has	been	central	to	this	process.	
	
Data	mining	and	customer	risk	profiling	
In	the	2009‐10	budget,	the	Australian	Government	announced	the	establishment	of	an	‘ongoing	
data	mining	capability	 in	Centrelink	that	will	help	 identify	customers	most	at	risk	of	receiving	
incorrect	 payments’	 (Australian	 Government	 2009).	 This	 would	 include	 ‘using	 advanced	
statistical	 techniques	 to	 identify	 high‐risk	 customers	 who	 would	 otherwise	 not	 have	 been	
identified	 under	 current	 approaches’	 (Australian	 Government	 2009).	 This	 followed	 more	
tentative	moves	 by	 Centrelink	 to	 develop	 its	 data	mining	 capability,	 including	 undertaking	 a	
data	mining	pilot	in	the	2007	financial	year	(Australian	Government	2006).	In	2004,	Centrelink	
had	 also	 sought	 the	 consultancy	 services	 of	 the	 Advanced	 Analytic	 Institute	 based	 at	 the	
University	of	Technology	Sydney	(New	South	Wales),	which	assisted	in	a	number	of	ad	hoc	data	
mining	trials	and	projects	(Cao	2012).	But	from	2009,	the	Data	Mining	and	Predictive	Analytics	
Team	became	a	fixture	of	Centrelink’s	compliance	suite.	With	the	amalgamation	of	the	DHS	and	
Centrelink	 in	 2011,	 the	 Data	 Mining	 Team	 formed	 part	 of	 the	 DHS,	 initially	 housed	 in	 the	
Customer	Compliance	Branch	 (CCB)	and	now	 in	 the	Serious	Non	Compliance	 (SNC)	branch	of	
the	Business	Integrity	(BI)	Division.		
	
Data	mining	applications	in	social	security	compliance	
As	Daniel	 (SNC)	explains,	one	of	 the	main	roles	of	 the	Data	Mining	Team	has	been	to	 identity	
‘non‐compliance	 or	 customers	 who	 are	 at	 risk	 of	 becoming	 non‐compliant,	 or	 who	 have	
committed	fraud’.	Using	a	range	of	data	mining	techniques,	the	Team	mines	the	DHS	mainframe	
using	algorithms	 to	 identify	patterns	associated	with	welfare	debt	or	 fraud	 (Daniel	 SNC).	The	
data	 available	 to	 the	 Team	 are	 vast.	 They	 include	 demographic	 information	 about	 customers	
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such	as	 sex,	 age,	home	ownership	 status,	 Indigenous	status,	number	of	 children	and	payment	
type,	 as	 well	 as	 activity	 data:	 for	 example,	 registering	 a	 change	 of	 address	 or	 change	 in	
circumstances	with	the	Department	(Bohlscheid	2013).		
	
One	 initiative	 of	 the	 Data	 Mining	 Team,	 undertaken	 whilst	 it	 was	 part	 of	 the	 CCB,	 was	 the	
customer	 risk	 profiling	 project.	 To	 put	 it	 crudely,	 the	 Data	 Mining	 Team	mined	 ten	 years	 of	
customer	 data	 in	 the	 Centrelink	 Mainframe	 using	 decision	 tree	 methodology	 to	 identify	
demographic	 characteristics	 associated	 with	 welfare	 claimants	 that	 had	 been	 overpaid	
(interview	with	Henry,	SNC;	see	also	Bohlscheid	2013;	Zhao	et	al.	2009).	Based	on	the	results	
from	mining	this	data,	the	Team	developed	risk	profiles	and	applied	them	to	the	current	social	
security	 population	 to	 rank	 recipients	 as	 low,	 moderate,	 high	 or	 very	 high	 risk	 (Bohlscheid	
2013;	 Cao	 2012).	 As	 Henry	 (SNC)	 explains,	 ‘let’s	 say	 there’s	 600,000	 Newstart	 customers,2	
which	 there	 are,	 we	 will	 literally	 rank	 them	 from	 most	 apparently	 non‐compliant,	 to	 most	
compliant.	A	list	of	600,000’.		
	
Ultimately,	the	models	developed	by	the	Data	Mining	Team	have	provided	the	basis	for	making	
decisions	 about	 who	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 compliance	 reviews.	 Previously,	 a	 large	 volume	 of	
reviews	were	conducted	for	each	payment	type.	As	Henry	explains,	 ‘they	[then	Department	of	
Family	and	Community	Services]	would	insist	on	doing	1.1	million	Newstart	reviews,	500,000	
Aged	Pension	reviews	…’	Now,	the	vast	majority	of	reviews	are	the	result	of	selections	made	by	
the	 Data	Mining	 Team:	 ‘[I]nstead	 of	 doing	 4	million	 reviews	 a	 year,	 we	 could	 reduce	 it	 to	 1	
million.	 You	 can	 imagine	 the	 savings	 attached	 to	 that’.	 Data	mining	 is	 thus	 lauded	 as	 a	more	
effective	and	efficient	means	for	prioritising	compliance	activities.	
	
The	Data	Mining	Team	is	now	housed	within	 the	SNC	Section.	Consequently,	 its	work	 is	more	
focused	 on	 identifying	 patterns	 and	 developing	models	 to	 detect	 fraud.	 Differing	 views	were	
presented	 by	 participants	 about	 the	 process	 of	 making	 selections	 from	 the	 data	 in	 the	 SNC,	
which	may	be	the	result	of	recent	and	significant	changes	to	the	team,	including	its	shift	to	the	
SNC	Section.	According	to	Henry,	speaking	in	2014,	‘what	we	do	now	is,	we	continue	to	meet	the	
needs	 of	 compliance	 by	 sending	 them	 selection	 cases,	 but	we	 cream	off	 the	 top	 and	we	 send	
them	 to	 the	 Intelligence	 Assessment	 Unit	 for	 investigation	 and	 that’s	 working	 out	 extremely	
well’.	 But	 this	 is	 a	 point	 that	 senior	 management	 strongly	 refutes.	 Instead,	 management	
explained	that	selections	in	the	SNC	Section	have	always	been	based	on	precise	triggers,	rather	
than	broad	statistical	correlations	between	demographic	factors	and	apparent	non‐compliance.	
In	other	words,	the	‘cream’	was	never	simply	transferred	to	the	SNC	for	investigation.		
	
However,	 in	 a	 subsequent	 interview	 conducted	 with	 Daniel,	 a	 Data	 Miner	 in	 the	 SNC,	 he	
suggested	that:		
	
It’s	[referral	of	customers	identified	as	at	very	high	risk	of	non‐compliance	to	the	
SNC]	something	that	was	occurring	earlier	on.	At	the	moment,	we’ve	moved	away	
from	that	sort	of	approach.	The	indicators	of	somebody	being	non‐compliant	are	
not	 the	same	as	 that	of	 someone	who	 is	behaving	 in	a	 fraudulent	manner.	 So	 if	
you	 build	 the	 model	 to	 target	 non‐compliance,	 the	 top	 one	 per	 cent	 is	 not	
necessarily	 fraudulent.	 So	 we’ve	 moved	 towards	 building	 models	 targeting	
serious	non‐compliance	more	specifically.	
	
According	to	Daniel	(SNC),	data	mining	activities	in	the	SNC	are	usually	focused	on	a	subset	of	
the	claimant	population:	for	example,	by	payment	type,	rather	than	the	population	as	a	whole.	
The	Team	uses	a	 range	of	 techniques	 to	mine	demographic	 and	activity	data	 to	 identity	 risks	
associated	with	fraud.	This	includes	examining	‘historic	prosecutions	data,	which	we	can	use	to	
try	to	identify	people	that	have	similar	characteristics’.	As	Daniel	(SNC)	explains,	‘We’ll	usually	
identify	between	30	and	a	100	parameters	that	we	will	use	as	inputs	into	the	model,	which	will	
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then	select	 the	most	relevant	subset	of	 these	 to	use’.	The	model	 is	 then	applied	to	 the	pool	of	
customers	escalated	to	the	SNC	by	the	CCB.		
	
Once	a	selection	is	made	this	is	translated	into	a	list	of	customers.	This	list	is	then	passed	on	to	
an	 intelligence	 team	 which	 examine	 potential	 cases,	 and	 decide	 whether	 further	 action	 is	
warranted.	In	other	words,	there	are	layers	of	‘human	analysis’	separating	the	identification	of	a	
customer	as	at	risk	of	fraud	and	actually	labelling	that	customer	as	‘criminally	suspicious’.		
	
Conceptualising	risk	in	data	mining	
Data	mining	is	essentially	concerned	with	prediction.	It	is	‘directed	toward	the	identification	of	
behaviour	 and	 status	 markers	 that	 serve	 as	 reliable	 indicators	 of	 a	 probable	 future’	 (Gandy	
2006:	 364).	 This	 calculative	 process	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 rationality	 of	 risk;	 individuals	 are	
reconceived	as	 clusters	of	 risk	 factors	 that	 can	be	 calculated	and	developed	 into	 risk	profiles.	
These	profiles	provide	the	basis,	or	least	one	of	the	bases,	from	which	decisions	are	made	about	
which	customers	deserve	scrutiny.	In	this	sense,	data	mining	is	a	tool	of	social	sorting	in	which	
people	are	placed	‘into	categories,	assigning	worth	or	risk,	in	ways	that	have	real	effects	on	their	
life	chances’	(Lyon	2002:	1).		
	
The	 work	 of	 the	 Data	 Mining	 Team	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 scientific	 and	 neutral	 exercise.	 In	
Henry’s	words,	‘we	let	maths	[sic]	and	science	take	over’.	But	as	Zedner	(2006:	427)	contends,	
‘to	conceive	of	risk	assessment	as	a	distinct	apolitical	calculative	exercise	is	to	ignore	the	extent	
to	which	the	very	definition	of	risk	is	context	based’.	 Indeed,	as	O’Malley	(2008:	453)	reminds	
us,	risk	‘is	always	a	moralized	way	of	governing’.	The	assumption	of	neutrality	in	fact	masks	the	
moral	judgments	involved	in	the	process	of	social	security	data	mining.	Significantly,	it	obscures	
the	 biases	 that	 may	 be	 embedded	 in	 the	 data.	 Unemployed	 recipients	 and	 single	 parent	
pensioners	have	long	been	more	frequent	targets	of	compliance	initiatives,	and	this	is	likely	to	
be	 reflected	 in	 the	 compliance	 data.	 The	 historical	 focus	 on	 these	 segments	 of	 the	 benefit	
population	 has	 not	 necessarily	 been	 underpinned	by	 evidence	 that	 these	 recipients	 are	more	
prone	 to	 fraud	 and/or	 non‐compliance.	 Instead,	 it	 reflects	 entrenched	moral	 anxieties	 about	
these	 payment	 recipients	 who	 have	 apparently	 failed	 to	 get	 a	 job	 (or	 keep	 a	 man).	 These	
segments	 of	 the	 welfare	 population	 have	 routinely	 been	 cast	 as	 less	 deserving	 than	 other	
welfare	beneficiaries,	 such	 as	disability	pensioners	 that	 apparently	need	assistance	due	 to	no	
fault	 of	 their	 own	 (although	 this	 latter	 assumption	 itself	 may	 also	 be	 unravelling)	 (Mendes	
2008).	
	
It	 is	 perhaps	 no	 surprise	 then	 that,	 when	 the	 former	 Department	 of	 Social	 Security	 (DSS)	
introduced	 the	 National	 Selective	 Review	 System	 in	 the	 1986	 financial	 year,	 it	 initially	 only	
applied	 to	 sole	 parent	 pensioners	 and	 unemployment	 benefit	 recipients,	 although	 as	 the	DSS	
explained,	 ‘[i]n	 the	next	couple	of	years	 the	system	will	be	expanded	to	cover	all	pension	and	
benefit	types,	as	well	as	recipients	of	the	various	forms	of	assistance	to	families’.	Single	parent	
pensioners	 and	 unemployment	 benefit	 recipients	 were	 also	 subject	 to	 mandatory	 in‐office	
interviews	and	were	the	sole	focus	of	Mobile	Review	Teams	(DSS	1987:	25‐6).	In	the	late	1980s,	
the	 apparent	 ‘campaign’	 against	 single	mothers	 on	welfare	was	 denounced	 by	 the	 Australian	
Federation	of	Community	Legal	Centres	(1988)	who	blamed	it	for	the	‘alarming	100%	increase	
in	the	number	of	women	jailed	for	social	security	fraud’	in	1988.		
	
In	more	recent	years,	particularly	with	the	rise	of	volume	reviews	in	the	late	1990s,	compliance	
activities	 have	 focused	 on	 all	 payment	 recipients.	 But	 single	 parents	 and	 the	 unemployed	
continued	to	attract	more	frequent	attention.	For	example,	in	2004‐05	a	special	budget	measure	
provided	 for	 Centrelink	 to	 ‘undertake	 20,000	 face‐to‐face	 interviews	 each	 year	 for	 Parenting	
Payment	 (Single)	 customers	 who	 report	 a	 change	 of	 address’,	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 verifying	
recipients’	 relationship	 status	 (Australian	 Government	 2004).	 The	 historical	 focus	 on	 single	
parent	pensioners	and	 the	unemployed	 is	 likely	 to	have	 resulted	 in	 the	overrepresentation	of	
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these	–	and	probably	other	‘undeserving’	–	claimant	populations	in	the	overpayment	and	fraud	
data.	 The	 process	 of	 data	 mining	 may	 simply	 reproduce	 entrenched	 class	 and	 gender	
inequalities	buried	in	the	data,	re‐articulating	them	within	the	neutral	and	scientific	language	of	
risk.		
	
Indeed,	there	is	some	evidence	to	support	this	contention.	Whilst	it	is	not	possible	to	gain	access	
to	current	data	mining	models,	some	indication	of	the	kinds	of	predictors	of	non‐compliance	can	
be	 discerned	 from	 articles	 published	 by	 consultants	 previously	 working	 for	 Centrelink.	 For	
example,	 using	 positive	 and	 negative	 sequence	 methodologies,	 Zhao	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 identified	
customers	aged	21	to	28	years	who	rent,	and	have	a	partner	who	earns	casual	income,	as	having	
a	high	probability	of	incurring	a	welfare	overpayment.	On	the	other	hand,	customers	who	own	
their	 home	 who	 visited	 the	 same	 customer	 service	 centre	 and	 received	 regular	 Centrelink	
payments	of	between	$400	and	$800	were	less	likely	to	incur	an	overpayment.	Where	the	first	
sequence	suggests	financial	and	perhaps	housing	insecurity,	the	latter	implies	someone	with	a	
more	stable	home	situation.	Ultimately,	many	of	the	risk	factors	identified	in	these	papers	are	
also	indicators	of	social	and	economic	disadvantage,	suggesting	that	class	politics	figure	in	risk	
formulations.		
	
Similarly,	 Zhao	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 identify	 being	 male	 as	 associated	 with	 incurring	 less	 debt.	
According	to	a	Henry	(SNC),	another	risk	factor	is:	
	
Number	of	children;	you	can	almost	understand.	Families	on	a	benefit	are	really	
vulnerable;	 not	 much	 money,	 large	 number[s]	 of	 children.	 There	 could	 be	 [a]	
tendency	to	not	let	us	know	something	rather	than	have	their	payment	reduced.	
	
As	a	consequence	of	these	variables,	it	follows	that	single	women	with	young	children	are	like	to	
be	 classed	 as	more	 risky	 than	men	without	 children.	 Single	women	have	been	 found	 to	be	 at	
greater	risk	of	not	repaying	debts	(Bohlscheid	2013).	Yet,	we	know	that	single	parent	families,	
which	 are	mostly	 headed	 by	women,	 face	 disproportionate	 levels	 of	 financial	 stress	 (Graham	
and	Marston	2012;	Linacre	2007).	It	would	appear	that	those	identified	as	most	at	risk	of	non‐
compliance	represent	the	most	socially	and	economically	disadvantaged	segment	of	the	welfare	
population.	This	aligns	with	Henman	and	Marston’s	 (2008:	201)	contention,	 ‘that	surveillance	
practices	–	as	a	burden	and	a	risk	of	being	surveilled	–	operate	and	coagulate	more	heavily	on	
the	more	disadvantaged	members	of	society’.		
	
After	 submitting	 a	 draft	 version	 of	 this	paper	 for	 review,	 senior	management	 ran	 some	basic	
demographic	analysis	 in	 the	 Integrated	Review	System	and	 found	no	statistically	 significantly	
over‐representation	of	any	specific	demographic,	including	based	on	sex	(DHS	2016).	According	
to	Daniel	(SNC),	none	of	the	models	‘have	pulled	out	gender	as	an	explanatory	variable’.	Gender	
is	however	‘[fed]	in	as	a	matter	of	course	as	it	may	be	relevant	and	is	a	simple	piece	of	data	that	
we	have	on	the	vast	majority	of	customers’.		
	
Regardless	of	whether	demographic	factors,	such	as	sex,	home	ownership	status	and	Indigenous	
status,	or	transactional	variables,	such	as	lodgement	of	change	of	address	forms,	are	strong	and	
reliable	indicators	of	non‐compliance,	a	more	fundamental	question	emerges:	is	it	appropriate	
to	 base	 decisions	 about	 who	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 surveillance	 on	 these	 factors?	 It	 may	 be	
undesirable	in	a	liberal	democratic	society	to	rely	on	demographic	variables	at	all,	particularly	if	
they	 would,	 in	 other	 contexts,	 be	 considered	 inappropriate	 or	 discriminatory.	 Yet,	 simply	
omitting	the	most	sensitive	or	problematic	variables,	such	as	sex,	race	or	marital	status,	would	
not	necessarily	answer	this	problem.	Firstly,	many	other	variables	correlate	with	these	sensitive	
variables.	And	omission	of	such	variables	 is	 likely	to	reduce	the	overall	accuracy	of	 the	model	
(Calders	and	Žliobaitė	2013).	Ultimately,	the	use	of	customers’	demographic	and	transactional	
information,	at	the	very	least,	warrants	a	cautionary	approach.		
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In	 any	 case,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 women	 are	 overrepresented	 in	 the	 prosecution	 statistics	
(Prenzler	 2012).	 In	 2013‐14,	 the	 most	 recent	 statistics	 available,	 women	 made	 up	
approximately	 62.8	 per	 cent	 of	 convictions	 (Senate	 Standing	 Committee	 on	 Legal	 and	
Constitutional	Affairs	2015).	In	the	same	year,	women	comprised	approximately	57.9	per	cent	
of	 the	 social	 security	population	 (DSS	2014).	Whilst	women	are	 slightly	overrepresented	as	a	
proportion	of	 the	 social	 security	population,	 in	 light	 of	 Steffensmeier	 and	Allan’s	 (1996:	259)	
oft‐quoted	statement	that	‘[w]omen	are	always	and	everywhere	less	likely	than	men	to	commit	
criminal	acts’,	the	overrepresentation	of	women	in	social	security	crime	statistics	is	exceptional.		
	
In	light	of	this,	I	asked	Henry	why	he	thought	women	were	overrepresented	in	the	prosecution	
statistics.	He	explained:	
	
Well,	I’ll	have	to	admit	that	I	didn’t	know	that.	Because	when	I	look	at	prosecution	
results	 and	 the	 data	 that	 comes	 back	 and	 forth	 and	 because	 I	 work	 in	 the	
Centrelink	mainframe,	I	guess	my	excuse	is	that	I’ve	always	looked	at	cases	based	
on	the	populations	they	come	from	and	I’m	so	analytical	it’s	not	really	people.	So,	
I	 look	 at	 them	 as	 Newstart	 cases	 or	 Parenting	 Payment	 Single	 cases	 –	 I	 guess	
that’s	a	lot	women,	if	not	nearly	all	women.		
	
As	this	comment	reveals,	the	technologies	of	data	mining	effectively	translate	welfare	recipients	
with	unique	needs,	identities,	histories	and	futures	into	clusters	of	potentialities	and	members	
of	risk	categories.	It	serves	to	distance	practitioners	from	the	outcomes	of	their	practice.		
	
Ultimately,	 the	 process	 of	 risk	 profiling	 reduces	 the	 complex	 individual	 and	 social	 causes	 of	
welfare	debt	 into	 individualised	 risk	 factors	produced	by	algorithms.	As	Henman	 (2004:	179)	
contends,	 in	 this	 process	 ‘the	 social	 and	 systemic	 aspects	 of	 the	 differential	 distribution	 of	
overpayments	are	deflected’.	Data	mining	does	not	and	cannot	enquire	into	the	cause/s	of	this	
overpayment.	 It	 instead	 focuses	 on	 post	 hoc	 risk	 management,	 usually	 in	 the	 form	 of	 debt	
recovery	 and/or	 investigation.	 This	 framework	 largely	 forecloses	 prevention	 or	 systemic	
reform	as	a	legitimate	response	to	non‐compliance.	A	number	of	studies	indicate,	 for	example,	
that	 simplifying	 complex	 income	 reporting	 obligations,	 particularly	 in	 light	 of	 the	 rise	 of	
precarious	 and	 casualised	work,	would	 significantly	 reduce	 overpayments	 (see	Hughes	2008;	
Hui,	Moerman	and	Rudkin	2011).	Yet	such	opportunities	are	obscured	by	this	risk	technology,	
which	is	squarely	focused	on	the	post	hoc	management	of	risky	welfare	populations.		
	
As	a	result	of	data	mining	activities	 in	 the	DHS,	 far	 less	people	have	been	subject	 to	 intrusive	
entitlement	 reviews.	 But	 these	 activities	 also	 result	 in	 closer	 scrutiny	 of	 specific	 welfare	
populations	 just	 because	 they	 ‘look’	 like	 past	 debtors	 or	 fraudsters,	 not	 because	 they	 are	
suspected	of	doing	anything	wrong.	And,	judging	from	the	available	data,	it	appears	that	these	
people	are	more	likely	to	be	the	most	disadvantaged	welfare	recipients.	Actuarial	risk	profiling	
may	simply	further	marginalise	already	disadvantaged	populations.		
	
Rearticulating	risk:	The	tiered	compliance	review	model		
Elsewhere	in	the	DHS,	risk	rationalities	are	playing	out	in	very	different	ways.	In	the	Customer	
Compliance	 Branch	 (CCB),	 which	 is	 concerned	 with	 overpayment	 and	 payment	 integrity	 as	
opposed	to	fraud,	the	introduction	of	a	tiered	system	of	compliance	reviews	has	ultimately	led	
to	 less	 accusatory	 and	 punitive	 interactions	 between	 the	 DHS	 and	welfare	 recipients.	 In	 this	
setting,	 risk	practices	are	 informed	by	 the	goals	of	economic	efficiency	and	early	 intervention	
and	prevention	of	non‐compliance.	This	model,	 albeit	 still	 very	much	aligned	with	neo‐liberal	
goals,	is	resulting	in	better	outcomes	for	‘risky’	welfare	recipients.		
	
In	its	2013‐15	Compliance	Program,	the	DHS	(2013:	8)	speaks	of	this	new	compliance	approach	
as	a	‘transformation’.	It	reports	that:	
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Significant	progress	has	been	made	in	this	transformation	by	establishing	a	risk‐
based	 business	 model	 and	 implementing	 a	 number	 of	 early	 intervention	
activities.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 new	 compliance	 interventions	which	 educate,	 inform	
and	assist	people	accessing	payments	and	services	(DHS	2013:	8).	
	
Whilst	compliance	reviews	have	always	been	an	administrative	process	principally	concerned	
with	 ensuring	 payment	 accuracy	 and	 raising	 overpayments,	 the	 previous	 review	 process	
effectively	 assumed	 the	 dishonesty	 of	 payment	 recipients.	 These	 ‘whole	 of	 payment	 reviews’	
involved	a	 full	 scale	examination	of	 the	person’s	 circumstances,	which	often	 included	 seeking	
information	from	customers’	employers	and	financial	institutions	and	inquiring	into	customers’	
relationship	status	and	 living	arrangements.	All	 information	provided	by	customers	had	to	be	
verified.	 The	 process	 and	 related	 debt‐recovery	 actions	 could	 be	 intrusive,	 embarrassing	 and	
cause	significant	distress	for	welfare	recipients	(Hughes	2008).		
	
The	new	tiered	model	re‐orients	the	review	process	to	better	assist	and	educate	customers	to	
comply	with	their	obligations.	It	aims	to	reduce	the	burden	on	recipients	and	target	risks.	Laurie	
(CCB)	explains	the	shift	as	follows:	
	
In	 years	 gone	 by,	 when	 we	 did	 a	 review,	 everyone	 had	 to	 provide	 everything	
irrespective	of	risk.	Now,	this	 is	more	tailored,	more	targeted	based	on	risk.	We	
want	to	remove	the	one‐size	fits	all	approach.	Having	been	involved	for	20	plus	
years,	we’ve	seen	a	real	shift	towards	a	more	targeted	approach	…	We	shouldn’t	
just	bombard	customers	with	letter	after	letter.	Inevitably,	we’ll	be	talking	to	the	
people	that	want	to	talk	to	us.	So	I	think	it	[moving	to	a	risk‐based	approach]	is	a	
great	process.		
	
According	to	John	(CCB)	who	was	directly	involved	in	the	development	and	implementation	of	
this	new	approach,	the	model	draws	explicitly	on	behavioural	economics	and	psychology:	
	
Essentially,	 [we	have	been]	 looking	 to	 incorporate	behavioural	 science	 into	our	
approach	and	the	theory	of	nudge	versus	shove	–	and	nudge	being	SMS	or	letters.	
How	can	we	word	and	construct	things	to	get	people	to	self‐correct	versus	having	
someone	having	to	do	that	for	them?	[This	framework	is	also]	starting	to	move	us	
into	 an	 approach	 around	 how	 do	we	 help	 customers	 comply,	 which	was	 a	 big	
shift	for	our	role	basically	within	Business	Integrity	but	more	broadly	within	the	
Department.	
	
This	idea	of	‘nudging’,	which	has	gained	currency	in	recent	years,	rests	on	the	assumption	that	
human	behaviour	can	be	effectively	guided	by	organising	and	structuring	the	context	in	which	
people	make	decisions:	that	is,	by	‘choice	architecture’	(Thaler	and	Sunstein	2008).	In	this	way,	
a	 nudge	 approach	 can	 be	 a	 corrective	 to	 fallible	 human	 behaviour	 (Leggett	 2014).	Nudge	 is	
distinguished	 from	 ‘pushing’:	 that	 is,	direct	 regulatory	practices	 in	which	behaviour	change	 is	
achieved	through	regulation	or	prohibition.	The	architects	of	‘nudge’	consider	it	to	be	a	form	of	
liberal	 paternalism,	 involving	 ‘soft’	 paternalism	 whilst	 still	 acknowledging	 individual	 agency	
(Leggett	 2014:	 7).	 This	 approach	 also	 accords	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 goal	 of	 cost	 efficiency:	
‘nudging’	 behaviour	 is	 considered	 more	 efficient	 and	 effective	 than	 more	 costly	 direct	
intervention	and	this	was	one	of	the	core	reasons	for	the	introduction	of	this	model.	As	John	put	
it,	 ‘the	approach	we	had	in	place,	whilst	effective	[was]	very	costly,	very	expensive’.	The	tiered	
approach	 aims	 to	 ‘provide	 the	 same,	 if	 not	 better,	 assurance	 through	 a	 more	 efficient	
compliance	model’.		
	
According	 to	 John,	 the	 approach	 involves	 three	 tiers.	 Drawing	 on	 data	 analytics,	 payment	
recipients	are	ranked	by	their	apparent	risk	of	non‐compliance.	This	risk	level	determines	the	
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‘tier’	of	intervention	they	will	be	met	with	if	they	are	identified	as	having	a	payment	discrepancy	
that	requires	review.	The	first	tier	involves	an	‘indirect	intervention’,	usually	a	letter	or	sending	
an	SMS	to	remind	a	customer	of	their	obligations	and	prompt	the	customer	to	self‐correct.	The	
second	tier	is	referred	to	as	‘early	intervention’.	As	John	put	it:		
	
…	 early	 intervention	 is	 about	 having	 a	 high	 speed	 contact	with	 a	 customer	but	
recognising	some	of	 these	customers	may	need	a	 little	bit	more	 involvement	or	
engagement	by	the	Department	to	get	their	circumstances	true	and	correct	…	So	
through	that	conversation,	we’re	able	 to	establish,	 if	you	 like,	whether	there’s	a	
reasonable	explanation	as	to	why	that	anomaly	exists,	and	if	there	is	we’re	able	to	
update	their	record	accordingly.	Again,	that	may	result	in	an	adjustment	to	their	
payment	or	a	debt,	but	we	can	do	that	over	the	phone,	and	again	we	use	that	as	
an	 opportunity	 to	 also	 educate	 customers	 about	 their	 obligations.	 That’s	
predominantly	designed	to	give	them	the	tools	to	not	get	into	debt	in	the	future.	
	
If	 the	customer	is	unable	or	unwilling	to	adequately	update	their	circumstances	or	provide	an	
explanation	for	their	payment	anomaly	over	the	phone,	their	case	is	escalated	to	the	‘third	tier’	
of	intervention.	This	involves	verifying	the	customer’s	circumstances	along	similar	lines	to	the	
former	 review	process.	However,	where	previously	 these	 reviews	were	 full	 scale,	 a	 third	 tier	
intervention	 is	 focused	 only	 on	 the	 aspect	 of	 the	 customer’s	 circumstances	 that	 has	 raised	
concerns.	For	example,	if	a	payment	discrepancy	has	arisen	in	respect	of	the	customer’s	income,	
inquiries	will	only	be	made	about	this	aspect	of	the	customer’s	circumstances.	
	
As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 approach,	 the	 kinds	 of	 interactions	 the	 Department	 has	 with	 welfare	
recipients	are	 far	 less	accusatory,	 intrusive	and	ultimately	 ‘softer’.	 It	also	removes	the	general	
assumption	 that	 recipients	 are	 dishonest.	 At	 least	 in	 the	 first	 two	 tiers	 of	 the	model,	 it	 takes	
recipients’	 accounts	 of	 their	 circumstances	 at	 face	 value	 without	 seeking	 independent	
verification.	Furthermore,	it	could	be	argued	that	this	model	effectively	rearticulates	customer	
risks	as	needs.	Specifically,	risk	of	non‐compliance	is	cast	as	an	indicator	of	need	of	assistance	
and	guidance	 to	 comply.	 In	 this	way,	 risk	of	 non‐compliance	 is	 remedied	with	 assistance	 and	
education	 via	 a	 variety	 of	 interventions	 to	 enable	welfare	 recipients	 to	 navigate	 the	 complex	
social	 security	 system,	 and	 also	 avoid	 debt	 in	 the	 future.	 Whilst	 this	 risk‐based	 approach	 is	
explicitly	underpinned	by	 the	 goal	of	 cost	 efficiency	 and	 ‘nudging’	 behavioural	 change,	 it	 also	
seeks	 to	 reduce	 the	 intrusiveness	 of	 the	 review	 process	 and	 support	 welfare	 recipients	 to	
comply	with	their	obligations,	resulting	in	less	punitive	outcomes.		
	
This	is	not	to	say	that	this	review	model	is	unproblematic.	It	leads	to	many	of	the	problems	that	
I	raised	in	relation	to	data	mining.	Indeed,	as	with	the	data	mining	program,	it	directs	attention	
to	 the	 post	 hoc	 management	 of	 overpayment	 and	 fraud,	 and	 is	 largely	 unconcerned	 with	
responding	 to	 the	 root	 causes	 of	welfare	 non‐compliance.	 The	politics	 of	 ‘nudge’	 assume	 that	
welfare	 recipients’	 behaviour	 simply	 needs	 to	 be	 guided	 in	 the	 right	 direction.	 It	 presents	
recipients	as	 lacking	adequate	skills,	knowledge	and	agency	to	manage	their	 lives,	rather	than	
inquiring	whether	the	compliance	system	itself	 is	 legitimate	and	fair.	The	focus	is	still	entirely	
on	 individual	 failings,	 foreclosing	 systemic	 change	 as	 a	 way	 of	 dealing	 with	 non‐compliance.	
Ultimately,	 this	 technology	 must	 be	 still	 cast	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 surveillance	 and	 population	
management.	 Like	 all	 risk‐based	 welfare	 surveillance	 initiatives,	 it	 reproduces	 the	 idea	 that	
welfare	 populations	 are	 risky	 and	 require	 intervention,	 even	 if	 the	 interventions	 that	 are	
pursued	are	more	benign.	 If,	 like	 the	data	mining	program,	 riskiness	 ‘coagulates’	on	 the	most	
disadvantaged	welfare	recipients,	it	is	the	individual	failings	of	these	recipients	that	will	come	to	
the	fore.	These	recipients	will	continue	to	bear	the	brunt	of	surveillance	practices.		
	
Nevertheless,	 the	 different	 application	 of	 risk	 in	 the	 tiered	 review	 model	 illustrates	 the	
malleability	of	 risk	 logics.	 It	affirms	the	arguments	of	 scholars	such	as	Maurutto	and	Hannah‐
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Moffat	 (2006)	 and	O’Malley	 (2001,	 2008,	 2010b)	 that	 highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 examining	
risk	technologies	in	context	in	order	to	grasp	the	multiplicity,	complexity	and	flexibility	of	risk	
logics.	As	the	examples	explored	in	this	paper	suggest,	there	is	potential	for	risk	rationalities	to	
be	 rethought	 and	 reformulated.	 Where	 compliance	 reviews	 have	 long	 acted	 as	 a	 system	 of	
informal	punishment,	through	the	technology	of	risk,	they	have	been	recast	as	opportunities	to	
guide	 and	 assist	 recipients.	 This	 suggests	 that	 concerns	 about	 justice	 and	 fairness	 may	 be	
articulated	alongside	risk.	It	opens	up	the	possibility	of	articulating	more	progressive	agendas,	
perhaps	even	 claims	 for	 redistribution,	 into	 the	accepted	 language	of	 risk.	 If,	 as	 the	 literature	
demonstrates,	financial	hardship	underlies	the	majority	social	security	fraud	offending	(see	Hui,	
Moerman	and	Rudkin	2011;	Walsh	and	Marston	2008),	increasing	welfare	payment	rates	could	
be	articulated	as	a	 fraud	risk	reduction	strategy.	 It	 is	perhaps	a	 far‐fetched	proposition	 in	the	
context	 of	 New	 Right	 political	 dominance,	 but	 it	 does	 provide	 a	 patent	 illustration	 of	 the	
malleability	of	risk	logics.		
	
Conclusion	
Over	 the	 last	30	years,	 the	Australian	DHS	and	 its	predecessors	have	established	an	 intrusive	
and	punitive	apparatus	for	detecting	and	investigating	fraud	and	overpayment.	The	rationalities	
of	risk	have	played	a	crucial	role	in	structuring	welfare	compliance	activities.	As	this	paper	has	
argued,	 entrenched	 social	 anxieties	 about	 single	 mothers	 and	 the	 unemployed	 have	 been	
translated	 into	 a	 pseudo‐scientific	 language	 of	 risk.	 In	many	ways,	 the	 rationality	 of	 risk	 has	
propelled	 the	 targeting	 of	 more	 marginalised	 welfare	 recipients	 rather	 than	 spreading	 the	
burden	of	welfare	surveillance.	By	employing	a	 ‘realist	governmentality’	approach,	 this	article	
has	 highlighted	 the	 complexity	 and	 flexibility	 of	 risk	 technologies	 in	 the	 Australian	 social	
security	system	with	reference	to	two	specific	risk‐based	initiatives:	the	data	mining	program;	
and	 the	 tiered	 review	model.	 This	 close	 analysis	 of	 the	 implementation	 and	operation	 of	 risk	
practices	‘on	the	ground’	demonstrates	that	risk	is	neither	neutral	nor	immutable,	and	may	be	
open	to	re‐articulation	alongside	more	progressive	goals.	
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1	Centrelink	was	established	in	1997	as	a	statutory	agency	responsible	for	the	delivery	of	human	services	under	the	
provisions	of	the	Commonwealth	Service	Delivery	Agency	Act	1997	(Cth).	On	1	July	2011,	Centrelink,	together	with	
Medicare	Australia,	was	integrated	into	the	DHS	as	a	result	of	the	Human	Services	Legislation	Amendment	Act,	2011	
(Cth).	The	Department	retained	the	brand	name	‘Centrelink’	to	refer	to	the	welfare	delivery	functions	it	took	over	
from	Centrelink	(Department	of	Human	Services	2015).	
2	‘Newstart	Allowance’	is	an	income	support	payment	for	unemployed	job	seekers.	
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